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ABSTRACT   
 
 
This paper notes certain key landmarks in the modern history of Western sociology of law. 
Taken together, these map developments that have given socio-legal studies some of its most 
influential and powerful theoretical ideas. But the paper asks how far such inherited ideas – 
and the research traditions they represent – are still useful in confronting the pluralistic, 
globalised and fragmented regulatory systems that proliferate today. How far can sociology of 
law maintain continuity with its past? This paper argues that it can maintain a strong 
continuity, but also that it must discard (or radically rework) some of its central inherited ideas 
that are coming to seem anachronistic in the face of contemporary socio-legal developments: 
especially developments relating to cultural pluralism, legal pluralism and transnational law. 
 
Keywords: Sociology of law; global legal pluralism; Japan; Ehrlich; Weber; cultural 
pluralism; transnational law; Islamic law. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: WEBER AND EHRLICH 
 
We should surely celebrate the fact that modern empirically-oriented sociology of law is now 
a century old. In Japan and in the main Anglophone countries the publication in 1913 of 
Eugen Ehrlich’s Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts has been seen as an outstanding 
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early intellectual landmark for sociology of law – a source of some of its basic concepts and 
methods – and, in some sense, a foundation of all subsequent thinking this field.  
 
Ehrlich’s work has, however, never had the centrality in Western socio-legal studies that it 
surely had for a long time in Japanese sociology of law.
1
 Theoretical and methodological 
resources in Anglophone sociology of law up to the present have come from many sources 
and, among classic social theorists, Max Weber can probably be seen as having had the most 
powerful and enduring influence, Marx’s insights having fallen into neglect since the 1980s. 
The Weberian influence has been important in shaping socio-legal ideas about law and 
economic development, the legal structures of capitalism, the character of modern formal 
legal rationality and the nature of the modern bureaucratic Rechtsstaat.  
 
Looking back over a century of Western research, Weber surely appears as the dominant 
classical socio-legal theorist of the highly developed capitalist state; a state structured by law, 
governing socio-economic relations through law, and entirely monopolising the production, 
interpretation and enforcement of law. Weber wrote at a time (the dawn of the twentieth 
century) when, in the West, the state appeared finally to have triumphed over all potentially 
competing sources of law: law would mean, for the foreseeable future, state law. The state’s 
claim to monopolise the legitimate use of force seemed fulfilled in the modern West, state 
law being the technical means of harnessing that force to the purposes of government. 
Weber’s thinking surely reflects the fact that he worked in an increasingly powerful 
Germany: a nation still celebrating its new political unity and its emergence as a great 
capitalist power; possessing a vast state apparatus and confident in its regulatory capacity and 
directive powers. Of all the classic social theorists it is Weber whose work most strongly 
conveys a sense of the inevitable domination of society and culture by the state and its law.  
 
In this context, Ehrlich’s promotion of an idea of ‘living law’ – authoritative social norms as 
contrasted with the norms by which state agencies decide disputes
2
 – is an act of constructive 
subversion – a challenge to the state’s omniscience in regulatory matters and, in particular, to 
that of jurists serving the state. The reason why the idea of living law had limited resonance 
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in the leading Western nations (perhaps in contrast to Japan) was surely that jurists in the 
most powerful Western states tended to assume that state law was substantially integrated 
with national socio-economic and cultural conditions. State officials and lawyers could 
assume that legal-political development and socio-economic development followed broadly 
parallel paths. So, in France, Emile Durkheim could write of the state as a ‘brain’ having the 
responsibility to ‘think’ on behalf of society as a whole, providing guidance for it but also 
expressing and reflecting the moral conditions of social solidarity.
3
 And for Weber the 
progress of the modern idea of law as a ‘rational technical apparatus’4 seemed to parallel the 
ongoing rationalisation of most other aspects of Western life.  
 
Ehrlich’s sociology of law, by contrast, suggests a potentially serious divorce between state 
law and social norms, or between politics and culture. It is surely no accident that he 
developed his ideas in what was then one of the most unstable of Western political societies, 
the crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the political structure of the imperial state 
was unable to embrace all the diverse local cultures of the regulated populations. As a loyal 
jurist, Ehrlich intended his sociology of law largely as a warning to the state and to his fellow 
state jurists, a warning that state law could be incompatible with the cultural expectations and 
experience of the populations it sought to regulate, and that this situation posed the risk of 
state law being ineffective, irrelevant, oppressive or unpredictable in its operation.  
 
Thus, where the idea of living law or similar ideas had influence in the early development of 
Western sociology of law, this was largely because living law was presented as an inevitable 
(or necessary) control on what state law could (or should) do. In contrast to Weber’s 
sociology of state law, Ehrlich’s ideas suggest an embryonic sociology of legal cultures 
subverting the idea of the all-powerful state having unlimited regulatory capabilities. 
 
This paper is concerned with ways in which these contrasting models of law have related to 
each other over the past century and, in particular, with their relation today. It can be said that 
the career of the living law concept (and similar ideas) has paralleled the career of the state as 
law-maker. When the state has been seen as supremely strong the idea of living law has had 
little purchase except among those who resent this strength; when the regulatory capacities of 
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the state (or the appropriateness of its regulation) have been put into doubt the idea of living 
law (or some related idea) has been practically important.  
 
I shall argue, however, that the concepts that underpin both the state law focus and the living 
law focus are becoming unstable. The growth of new types of law that are not tied securely to 
the state undermines any equation of law and state law. And the growth of transnational 
socio-economic networks that produce their own regulation indicates the need for more 
precise concepts than living law: new concepts are needed to distinguish the variety of social 
contexts in which regulation arises, and in which it claims authority and seeks acceptance. 
Sociology of law needs new ways to conceptualise ‘the social’.  
 
So, this paper will suggest that foundational ideas of sociology of law – its typical 
assumptions about law, state and society – need rethinking – and that the concept of living 
law may, after a century of productive application, have reached the limit of its usefulness. 
 
 
2. LIVING LAW: A PROBLEM FOR STATE LAW? 
 
Ehrlich saw living law as a practical and inevitable control on what the law of the state could 
realistically be expected to achieve. And what lay behind this vision was the idea that, while 
society’s self-regulation is fundamental, the state is only a derivative regulator, parasitic for 
its regulatory success on the conditions that society provides for state regulation to operate. 
Hence, Ehrlich’s anarchistic claim that one ‘might reasonably maintain that society would not 
go to pieces even if the state should exercise no coercion whatever’.5 Such a claim could be 
made polemically but was not likely to be taken seriously by Western jurists who were 
content to leave it to sociologists to study social norms and saw no reason to inform 
themselves about such studies. Jurists could assume that the main problem for the law of 
powerful Western states was not to defend it from bizarre charges of social irrelevance but to 
make it technically sophisticated, doctrinally consistent, convincingly rational, and the 
embodiment of social values recognised by the jurists themselves. All of these were matters 
that jurists could address without seeking any help from social scientists. 
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Although empirical research in sociology of law began much earlier in Japan, it did not 
develop significantly in Western countries until the 1960s. Until that time European 
sociology of law remained a largely theoretical subject – perhaps the most enduring 
contribution to it coming from scholars such as Georges Gurvitch who combined a focus on 
social theory with a background in philosophy.
6
 Until empirical evidence began to be 
collected systematically about the ‘gap’ between the aims of state law and its actual effects in 
society, sociology of law could be treated as a speculative social science, with little attention 
given to it by lawmakers or jurists. As is well-known, it was in the United States that Western 
empirical sociology of law – as ‘law and society’ research – began to establish itself most 
notably, after the mid-point of the 20
th
 century. As this empirical focus became prominent, 
theoretical efforts to develop a sociological concept of law seemed to decline.  
 
These theoretical efforts had characterised not only the work of the pioneers (e.g. Weber, 
Durkheim, Ehrlich and Leon Petrażycki) but also that of important later contributors 
influenced by them such as Gurvitch, Nicholas Timasheff and Pitirim Sorokin.
7
 The changed 
balance away from theory and towards empirical research from the second half of the 20
th
 
century is important. Before that change, juristic assumptions about the power and 
effectiveness of state law were little troubled by theoretical arguments about the significance 
of living law because hardly any empirical research had been done to show this significance. 
So, juristic legal theory (focused on state law) and socio-legal theory (derived from the work 
of scholars such as those mentioned above) could exist in entirely separate intellectual 
worlds. Hardly any influence of sociology of law on juristic thought occurred. Far from ideas 
of living law actually exerting some control on state law-making or judicial practice (as 
Ehrlich must have hoped might occur), an English jurist C. K. Allen could dismiss Ehrlich’s 
sociology of law as ‘megalomaniac jurisprudence’8 – in other words, a futile and impractical 
attempt to study all human social life and present it as an undifferentiated pile of data for 
juristic consideration. 
 
In the second half of the 20
th
 century as empirical sociology of law developed in Western 
countries, understandings in it of the relationship between state law and living law surely 
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changed greatly.
9
 Comparisons between ‘law in the books’ (the precepts of state law) and 
‘law in action’ (the social effects or consequences of this law) were made easier through 
expanding programmes of empirical research. Such developments were influenced by (and to 
some extent influenced) new ambitions in leading Western countries to use state law to steer 
and shape society and to respond to political imperatives to engineer essential socio-
economic change.  
 
From the 1960s and 1970s in Anglophone nations and elsewhere, state law was used 
(differently in various countries) to attack racial and sex discrimination (and, later, other 
forms of discrimination), to build welfare structures and shape welfare rights, to steer 
economies, to attack poverty and the social causes of crime, to uproot traditional restrictive 
practices and privileges, and to protect and promote aspects of national culture. In this 
context, one might see living law (and more broadly, existing social norms, conditions and 
attitudes) as presenting a set of problems for state law to solve. Living law might be seen in 
this context as an object of state intervention, sometimes a target for attack through state law.  
 
In this perspective the idea of living law as a control on the operation of state law is turned on 
its head. The state is assumed to have the power to regulate; what are required are techniques 
to make it possible to recognise and overcome obstacles to law’s effectiveness. Much socio-
legal research was directed to discovering and addressing such obstacles. It could be 
interesting to compare this research development with the change in ideas about living law 
that seems to have occurred in very different circumstances in Japan, as the influence of 
Izutaro Suehiro’s thinking about the relation of state to living law gave way to that of 
Takeyoshi Kawashima.
10
 
 
The era of the activist state promoted, in Western socio-legal studies, a wealth of research 
about the mechanisms of state law – on police, administrative and enforcement agencies, 
legal professions, judicial decision-making, citizens’ access to justice, and legislative 
processes. It could be called the period of state optimism – a brief period animated by a sense 
that, if the right techniques could be devised and used with adequate knowledge of socio-
economic conditions, significant social change (and a greater realisation of desirable social 
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values such as equality, democracy and liberty) could be brought about through law. 
However, I think that one of the most important effects of the proliferation of empirical 
socio-legal research was to encourage, very quickly, a growing disillusionment about the 
state’s capabilities. Research reporting regulatory failure or unintended consequences of law 
soon accumulated, and critiques, from the 1980s, of juridification, or excessive legalisation, 
of social spheres
11
 have been widely influential.
12
  
 
It is surely significant that some of the most powerful of these critiques have been informed 
by perhaps the most sophisticated theory in contemporary sociology of law – Niklas 
Luhmann’s autopoiesis theory. This theory in no way denies law’s important contribution to 
the specific character of complex, functionally differentiated modern societies, but its thrust 
is to warn incessantly of the dangers of ‘over-extension’ of law, and it does so in ways that 
encourage a politically conservative view of law’s social tasks. The perceived danger of over-
extension is not here seen as arising from recalcitrant living law; it is seen as resulting from 
limitations built into law itself as a communication system or discourse. While early 
sociology of law (e.g. Gurvitch) sometimes developed new concepts of law to show law’s 
regulatory potential far beyond what jurists recognised, Luhmannian sociology of law 
conceptualises law in a way that defends a strictly limited (although vital) place for it in 
society, more or less consistent with conservative juristic understandings of law’s practical 
scope. 
 
Alongside this particular resurgence of theory it is easy to point to general socio-legal 
developments that indicate great challenges for the state in governing through law. The rest 
of this paper focuses on these developments and suggests that they are beginning to pose a 
challenge also to ways of thinking that have been familiar in sociology of law from its 
beginnings – about ‘society’ as the object of legal regulation, and the state as creator of law 
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3. CHALLENGES FROM CULTURAL PLURALISM 
 
In Britain and many other European countries much debate now centres on the challenges 
that multiculturalism, or cultural pluralism, poses for state law. Very recently the British 
Home Secretary
13
 has announced an inquiry to be conducted on behalf of the UK government 
into ‘the application of Shari’a law in England and Wales’. The announcement was provoked 
by the view that, as the Home Secretary put it, ‘we know enough to know we have a problem, 
but we do not yet know the full extent of the problem. For example, there is evidence of 
women being “divorced” under Shari’a law and left in penury, wives who are forced to return 
to abusive relationships because Shari’a councils say a husband has a right to “chastise”, and  
 
Shari’a councils giving the testimony of a woman only half the weight of the testimony of a 
man.’ 14 In fact, substantial empirical research has been done on the operation of Shari’a law 
principles among Muslim minorities in Britain and other European countries, but not enough 
systematic data exists to provide an entirely clear picture.  
 
This is an area in which research on living law rooted in the culture (especially traditions and 
beliefs) of a particular religious minority is now seen to be urgently required. It is likely that 
in important respects dispute resolution in Shari’a councils works well and is widely accepted 
because it responds to the cultural expectations and understandings of the populations it 
serves. For these populations the norms applied may fully deserve respect as law and may 
sometimes be more meaningful and relevant in everyday life than much state law.  
 
However, Shari’a-influenced living law may also sometimes appear inconsistent with what 
are seen as underlying values of state law; it may seem to undermine this law insofar as state 
law purports to represent these values as universally defended in its jurisdiction. Controversy 
centres on the jurisdiction of Shari’a councils over religious marriages and divorces and 
associated property matters – making decisions lacking the binding force of state law but 
having popular acceptance among Muslims as living law. As the statement quoted earlier 
suggests, it is the position of women in Shari’a that is most problematic from the perspective 
of state law, which now claims to be based on a universal value postulate of gender equality. 
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Cultural pluralism is a normal, inevitable and, one might say, necessary and desirable 
condition of large, highly developed, contemporary political societies. As flows of population 
around the world continue, recipient societies are enriched and national cultures reinvigorated 
by newcomers bringing with them different cultural inheritances – ‘imported’ varieties of 
living law. Ultimately state law’s capacity to direct this process of import of foreign culture is 
limited. So, it can be asked: is this living law (i) a control on state law (following Ehrlich) so 
that state law must accommodate it or (ii) a problem for state law to attempt to remove using 
well designed techniques? I think it is neither, although attempts have been made to think of 
it in both of these ways.  
 
For example, as regards accommodation by state law to living law, the idea of ‘cultural 
defences’ in criminal law and other legal fields has been invoked in some Western legal 
systems.
15
 According to this idea it could be appropriate in certain cases for evidence of 
relevant features of the particular minority culture of an offender to be admitted in court to 
help to explain the motivation of acts done; these cultural factors might then sometimes be 
taken into account as mitigation in the court’s sentence. However, the risk of uncontrolled 
subjectivity in cultural defences and their potential incompatibility with orthodox conceptions 
of the rule of law make it unlikely that they could ever be free of fierce controversy.  
 
As regards the second approach (treating the living law of cultural pluralism as a problem to 
be solved by appropriate state law techniques), this can be seen in efforts to make cultural 
pluralism more or less invisible in the public realm by determined enforcement of apparent 
cultural uniformity. Hence the attack by state law in several continental European countries 
on symbols of cultural pluralism such as the Muslim female veil, prohibiting the wearing of it 
in public places.
16
 But some such efforts to employ state law seem to have been made in 
forgetfulness of much research on the resilience of culture – especially those aspects of it 
rooted in basic beliefs. 
 
How should sociology of law address cultural pluralism? How, in these conditions, is the 
relationship between state law and living law to be worked out? As noted above, it seems that 
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one approach would be to accommodate state law to living law; the opposite one would be to 
force living law to yield to state law. Neither seems satisfactory. Neither recognises the 
complexity and subtlety of the interactions involved between state law and social norms. I 
think the difficulty here is caused by the dualistic, confrontational, either/or way in which the 
issues are presented, and this dualism is surely a legacy of Ehrlich’s sociology of law.  
 
In this scenario, on one side are all the norms (treated as an undifferentiated category) by 
which state courts and other authorities decide disputes (Entscheidungsnormen). On the other 
side is living law (lebendes Recht), a conceptually undifferentiated mass of norms existing in 
social associations of innumerable kinds. But the social – the social environment in which 
state law operates – needs to be understood with more conceptual subtlety: the idea of 
cultural pluralism implies many ways in which the social is differentiated – for example, by 
religious belief, by customs and traditions, by language, by geographical factors, by shared 
history and collective memory, by emotional allegiances and rejections, and by economic 
conditions.
17
  
 
A uniform concept of living law can hardly recognise these very varied criteria of distinction 
in the social; nor does it suggest in itself the contrasting kinds of attitudes to regulation and 
problems of regulation that may be associated with them. State law may face different 
problems in regulating social relationships founded on traditions and customs, as compared 
with those centred on fundamental values or beliefs, or on emotional attachments or 
rejections, or on shared economic necessities or opportunities. 
 
The above analysis indicates some reasons why the concept of living law may no longer be 
useful, at least in Western societies, to sociology of law. Sociology of law can make more 
progress if it replaces the idea of living law with that of law rooted in different types of 
communal relations and if it then distinguishes carefully these types (as Weberian ideal 
types) and asks what general regulatory problems and needs each of the types might present. 
As a first step in this project it would be necessary to distinguish: 
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 relations of community based on shared ultimate values or beliefs (which might be 
religious beliefs, but could equally be fundamental secular values such as human 
rights or human dignity), 
 
 those based on shared or convergent economic or other instrumental projects,  
 
 those grounded in tradition and custom or the mere fact of co-existence in an 
established shared environment (whether a geographical environment, a linguistic 
one, or one historically shaped by shared experience or collective memory),  
 
 and those based on affective ties (affection, emotional attraction or rejection, love, 
hatred).  
 
Evidence from research in sociology of law and comparative legal studies might then suggest 
that each of these ideal (pure) types of communal relations presents, in general, significantly 
different regulatory problems and possibilities.
18
 But, in reality, these types will not exist in 
isolation but will be combined in complex ways; these combinations make what could be 
called networks of community, or communal networks. They include what Ehrlich thought of 
as social associations. But communal networks can be big or small: as small as the 
relationship between two contracting parties; as large as a nation, or a transnational 
community of religious believers such as the members of the world-wide Catholic Church. 
 
I have developed this idea of communal networks based on ideal typical communal relations 
extensively elsewhere and have applied it in many socio-legal contexts.
19
 I think that this 
analytical framework offers concepts more precise than the all-embracing idea of living law. 
Using such an approach makes it possible to avoid the unreal either/or conundrum of a 
confrontation between state law and living law in cultural pluralism. Using the concept of 
communal networks we can claim that all law including state law arises in such networks, 
because the national political society is itself a (complex) example of such a network. The 
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problem for sociology of law is then not to work out the relationship between state law and 
living law, but to analyse how law is produced in many different kinds of communal 
networks and how these various networks interact. Thus, the national political society 
(Britain, Japan), as a communal network, is composed of, but also must integrate and co-
ordinate, many other communal networks within it.  
 
Therefore, state law as the law of the national political society has to respect and draw 
sustenance from forms of regulation produced in the numerous communal networks within 
this society; but it must also guide and co-ordinate the regulation of these networks to ensure 
the overall integrity of the national political society.  
 
When state law interacts with the legal structures, expectations and aspirations of particular 
minority groups, what legal sociologists should see is the interaction (and potential conflict) 
between different communal networks, each producing its own ‘law’ and its own legal 
expectations and demands. What really exists is not the dualism of state law versus living 
law, but a natural regulatory pluralism that mirrors cultural pluralism. This is surely the 
condition – not to be regretted but to be welcomed as a challenge for legal sociologists – that 
now exists generally in most – perhaps all – large, developed, modern societies. 
 
All of this may suggest that the formula ‘law and society’ which has long defined the focus of 
sociology of law should generally be avoided. It is misleading insofar as it seems to set ‘law’ 
and ‘society’ against each other, as two distinct monolithic phenomena. Much of sociology of 
law has been concerned to study the ‘impact’ of law on society, or the ‘gap’ between law and 
society, or the ‘influence’ of society on law. But a view of law as existing in and created in 
communal networks avoids these crude oppositions. It suggests, indeed, that even the concept 
of ‘society’ might now be of limited use20 for sociology of law and a concept of social 
relations of community might be more useful – because this latter concept can recognise 
explicitly the diversity of types of these relations and how law reflects and grows out of them.  
 
An approach that views law as located and created in communal networks would reject the 
idea of society as an entity to which law must relate. Instead it would emphasise different 
kinds of social relations that can be thought of as relations of community insofar as they rely 
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on a degree of mutual trust and have some stability and endurance, and it would see law 
regulating innumerable communal networks varying in size and scope (intra-national, 
national, transnational). 
 
 
4. CHALLENGES FROM LEGAL PLURALISM  
AND TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
  
If the concept of society is problematic for sociology of law, perhaps the concept of law is 
also problematic. Sociology of law has long assumed that ‘law’ means state law. It is well-
known that when Ehrlich introduced the concept of living law he failed to indicate clearly in 
what sense it should be thought of specifically as law. His concept of law remains very 
unclear
21
 and Franz Neumann complained of the ‘entire lack of a genuine legal theory’ in 
Ehrlich’s sociology of law.22 Ultimately the typical juristic (state) model of law lies behind 
much of his thinking, as behind most research in sociology of law since his time.  
 
Sociology of law is increasingly faced with the necessity of recognising that state law is not 
the only kind of law that it must address and that the normal condition in the contemporary 
world is one of legal pluralism – the co-existence or conflict of distinct legal regimes 
purporting to regulate the same social space. The concept of legal pluralism has been present 
in sociology of law from its earliest phases, emphasising the existence of many forms of law 
other than the law of the state.
23
 Sometimes it has been emphasised that state law itself should 
not be seen as a single legal regime.
24
 Indeed, legal ‘plurality’ usually exists in some form, 
even in what lawyers would recognise as highly integrated legal systems, and is dealt with by 
normal juristic methods.  
 
However, relations between, for example, European Union law and EU member states’ law 
or between EU law and World Trade Organisation law are not always merely routine 
interpretive matters but can often provoke debate about the fundamental nature of the legal 
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regimes involved. And the question of how to handle the relations of state and international 
legal systems operating in the same social spaces has become more acute. This is because 
international law (i) has sought greater ‘independent’ authority, less easily subsumed into 
state authority, for example via assertions of ius cogens, (ii) has become more prominent in 
the regulatory landscape by developing in many new or newly significant doctrinal fields 
(such as human rights, trade and finance, environment and intellectual property), and (iii) 
now sometimes (as with international criminal law) addresses directly the citizens of 
particular states. Further, international law has increasingly been seen as fragmented into a 
diversity of legal regimes whose relations are sometimes unclear.  
 
Beyond all of this, many further dimensions of regulatory plurality are now widely 
recognised by Western legal sociologists and an increasing number of sociologically-oriented 
lawyers. Much regulation created in (often transnational) networks of interaction  – such as 
merchant communities (lex mercatoria), corporate groups, industries, financial systems, 
internet developers, ‘private’ NGO movements, religious communities, or sports 
organisations – has been shown empirically to be at least as practically powerful as much 
juristically recognised law, and no less authoritative for those subject to it. Much is 
characterised by unions of primary and secondary rules, such as H. L. A. Hart associated with 
a legal system.
25
 Some lawyers, indeed, speak of ‘transnational private law’ to include at least 
some regulation created wholly or partly in these kinds of communal networks.  
 
The result of all these developments
26
 is to challenge any idea that law can now be equated 
with state law. So, for sociology of law, as for juristic thought, the question of the concept of 
law becomes significant. There is a problem of deciding what should be taken to be ‘law’ for 
the purposes of sociology of law. It is no longer adequate to assume that law means what the 
state produces and authorises as legal regulation through its legislature(s) and courts. Many 
Western writers have referred to the contemporary legal landscape as one of ‘global legal 
pluralism’.27 The issue is not merely to decide as a conceptual matter what is to be recognised 
as law for the purposes of research; it is also to consider how to assess the authority of the 
                                                     
25
   Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 edn (1994). 
26
  For a valuable survey of the variety of forms of global governance that are now developing outside or 
alongside state law see A.-J. Arnaud, La gouvernance: Un outil de participation (2014). 
27
  Among much diverse literature, see e.g. P. S. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law 
beyond Borders (2012). 
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numerous different kinds of regulation that now exist, addressing individuals, organisations, 
corporations and states in an era of globalisation and of the transnational operation of law. 
 
If the state’s practical monopoly of law is being challenged by global legal pluralism, it is 
important also to note briefly some other considerations that alter perceptions of the state’s 
capacity to regulate through law. Even in many strong, stable, representative democracies this 
capacity is weakened in ways that legal sociologists should study. To take a few examples: 
private forces (corporate interests, mass media pressure, corruption) sometimes influence or 
constrain the practical exercise of state authority; tax evasion and avoidance, and misuse of 
public finances, can diminish financial resources available to make the exercise of state 
authority effective; and resources of expertise available to parts of the ‘private sector’ may be 
superior to those on which public regulatory agencies can draw.  
 
Equally significant is the point that a state’s practical regulatory capacity often depends on its 
‘external’ strength in the world, that is, its strength relative to other states. Globalisation 
pressures limit freedom of action for all but the most powerful states, often directly affecting 
the content of legislation, for example in areas of economic policy. Official or unofficial 
extraterritorial law enforcement by some states affects the practical legal authority of others 
over their citizens. Extradition provisions can sometimes have similar effects, in effect 
handing over the exercise of legal authority in particular cases to another state. Some states 
are able even to exercise punitive force in others without permission, including the power 
(e.g. through clandestine raids or use of remote technology) to execute or seize residents of 
weaker states in the territory of those states. In this way they undermine weaker states’ 
capacity to assert their own authority within their borders. And as is well known, disparities 
of power between states are reflected in the shape, use and effects of international law,
28
 so 
that its legitimacy as an extension of the political authority of states, founded on their consent 
as an international community, is often doubted.  
 
In the light of these conditions any idea that sociology of law can treat the state as a given – 
as a law-making agency that does not, itself, require much analysis – is hard to sustain. 
Globalisation not only encourages the growth of new kinds of regulation outside the control 
of states as autonomous law-makers. It also directs attention to the diversity of states as 
                                                     
28
  See e.g. N. Krisch, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the 
International Legal Order’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 369-408. 
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regulators and the fact that their law-making and law-enforcing capacities are powerfully 
shaped by both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ pressures.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
If we think of sociology of law’s time-honoured focus as having been ‘law and society’, it is 
necessary to recognise that both elements in this focus (both ‘law’ and ‘society’) have been 
destabilised and sociology of law can no longer operate with many assumptions on the basis 
of which much of its research in past decades has been conducted. As has been seen, the 
concept of society may be much less useful than it has been assumed to be in the past because 
it is becoming harder to think of law as relating to a single national political society in which 
culture can be assumed to be uniform. As globalisation progresses and associated movements 
of populations around the world become normal phenomena, an intensification of cultural 
communication is occurring. National political societies that formerly seemed to be relatively 
homogeneous now are forced to recognise the considerable cultural diversity existing within 
them, as well as between them.  
 
This cultural diversity can be represented theoretically in sociology of law by using ideal 
types of social relations of community and by emphasising the innumerable ways in which 
these types of community can be combined in groups and networks. This approach highlights 
the variety of different ways in which cultural bonds are maintained – especially through 
shared beliefs and ultimate values, through common economic interests and projects, through 
tradition, customs and co-existence in a shared environment, and through emotional 
attachments and allegiances. 
 
The concept of law – the other pole of ‘law and society’ – is also coming to seem something 
that can no longer be taken for granted in Western sociology of law. Law is no longer just the 
law of the state, but a huge amount of research on sociology of law has focused on the 
workings of state law – its regulatory successes and (more often) failures. Even if legal 
sociologists retain this focus there is a need to devote much attention to the way various 
factors both ‘internal’ (arising in the national political society) and ‘external’ (often 
associated with globalisation and international relations) affect the state’s capacities as a 
regulator. But there is also a need for a sophisticated sociology of international law and a 
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sociological focus on the many forms of regulation that address individuals, groups and 
corporations across national boundaries and are not limited by the borders of state 
jurisdiction. The term transnational law is now widely used to refer to these latter categories 
of regulation. In this brief paper it is not possible to discuss the many complexities and 
challenges for research that arise with this expanded understanding of the scope of law. 
Suffice it to say that they are setting new agendas for Western sociology of law, as for jurists.  
 
It is likely that these developments will encourage increasing interaction between jurists and 
legal sociologists. Empirical studies in sociology of law will be increasingly needed by jurists 
to map out the emerging new forms of regulation and to study the networks of community in 
which these forms of regulation are created or which they purport to address. At the same 
time, sociology of law will need to pay more attention than it has in past decades to the 
concept of law. It is no longer possible to leave the question ‘What is law?’ to the theorising 
of legal philosophers; it has become a practical matter. Sociology of law has more 
opportunity than at any time since Ehrlich and Weber to define for itself its field. It can no 
longer merely accept juristic understandings of law because these are beginning to be in flux. 
Sociology of law can help to shape those understandings through its researches, at the same 
time as it observes and benefits from juristic efforts to impose normative order on the new 
forms of regulation that are proliferating in the shadow of globalisation. 
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